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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
DETERMINING THAT THE 04/14/08 SENTENCE WAS AN 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE; AND THE DISTRICT COURT, ITSELF, 
ESTABLISHED THE RESULTING PREJUDICE TO MR. 
WATERFIELD. 
Although by way of a somewhat circuitous route, u[t]he State 
[nevertheless] acknowledges that the trial court incorrectly ruled 
that it imposed an 'illegal sentence' on April 14." See Brief of 
Appellee State of Utah, p. 16 (emphasis added); accord State v. 
Garner, 2008 UT App 32, 1|l7, 177 P. 3d 637 (explaining that "errors 
[that] . . . can be described as ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill' 
errors [are] regularly reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure xand do not qualify for review 
under rule 22 (e).")1 (quoting State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 
fl5, 84 P.3d 854) ). 2 The issue then, is whether Defendant was 
harmed or prejudiced by the district court's error. 
The State argues that "Defendant has failed to show that he 
was prejudiced by the [district] court's determination that the 
xAs acknowledged by the State, this also applies to the reasoning 
utilized by the district court in setting aside the sentence imposed 
on May 19, 2008. 
2This is consistent with the established principle underlying 
Rule 22(e) case law that "[w]hile rule 22(e) allows a court to review 
an illegal sentence at any time, it must be 'narrowly circumscribed' 
to prevent abuse." State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^15, 84 P.3d 
854 (quoting State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, %5, 48 P. 3d 228 (per 
curiam) ) . 
1 
April 14 sentence was illegal." See Brief of Appellee State of 
Utah, p. 29. This position is contradicted by both the 
established facts and the district court's conclusions of law. 
The parties in the instant case appeared pursuant to an AP&P 
probation violation report and affidavit for an order to show 
cause hearing on April 14, 2 008. Based on admissions, the court 
revoked Mr. Waterfield's probation, which it then reinstated for 
72 months, sentencing him to one year in the Davis County Jail and 
ordering Mr. Waterfield to be screened, enter into, and complete 
the RSAT Program. Thereafter, a brief screening took place by way 
of an interview of Mr. Waterfield. 
Pursuant to a violation report filed May 15, 2008, AP&P 
alleged, based on the brief screening, that Mr. Waterfield had 
violated probation by failing to enter into, participate in, or 
complete the RSAT Program as directed by the court. Apparently, 
AP&P, at that point, believed Mr. Waterfield needed an intensive 
inpatient treatment rather than the RSAT Program. 
On May 19, 2008, the court, pursuant to stipulation, 
sentenced Mr. Waterfield to the original two indeterminate terms 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison to be served consecutively. At that hearing, Mr. 
Waterfield's trial counsel informed the court of various 
discrepancies between the level of addiction claimed by the State 
2 
by way of the RSAT assessment and a Serenity House assessment of 
Mr. Waterfield. 
Moreover, in a Motion to Appoint Counsel, Mr. Waterfield's 
retained trial counsel asserted the illegality of the sentence 
imposed on May 19, 2008, due to Mr. Waterfield being illegally 
denied access to the RSAT Program, that the level of addition had 
been improperly inflated by the State, that the court did not hear 
from conflicting witnesses regarding Mr. Waterfield's denial to 
the RSAT Program, and that probation had been improperly revoked 
due to no fault of Mr. Waterfield. 
Almost four months later, at a review hearing on September 8, 
2008, the district court, sua sponte, suspended the sentence 
imposed on April 14, 2008, as an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 The court 
determined the sentence to be illegal because it failed to suspend 
the sentence prior to sentencing Mr. Waterfield to jail. As a 
result of the Rule 22(e) ruling, the court stated, "[W]e're back 
right there. We're at the date of April 14. [Mr. Waterfield] has 
just admitted his probation violations, and so now I'm going to 
have that sentencing." (R. 468:2:19-22). Based on that ruling, 
the district court concluded that its ruling rendered the issues 
3In addition, the district court determined that the sentencing 
on May 19, 2 008, was invalid due to the lack of a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of a Presentence Report by Mr. Waterfield (R. 382). 
3 
surrounding the RSAT Program screening moot even though the court 
continued to harbor serious concerns about the validity of the 
screening utilized by AP&P as a basis for denying him access to 
the RSAT Program (R. 468:2:23-25; 468:3:10-11; and 468:9:11-16). 
Consequently, the district court, by way of its erroneous ruling, 
precluded Mr. Waterfield from challenging the dubious RSAT Program 
assessment. As a result, Mr. Waterfield was erroneously precluded 
from having the court legitimately consider him for a residential 
drug treatment program such as the RSAT Program. 
II. THIS COURT, AS CONCEDED BY THE STATE, SHOULD 
REMAND THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE ALL 
OF MR. WATERFIELD'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) provides in relevant part: 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved 
by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of 
the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot 
be resolved, the court shall make a determination 
of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a); see also State v. Maroney, 2004 UT 
App 206, 1(26, 94 P. 3d 295. Whether the trial court properly 
resolved, on the record, the accuracy of contested information in 
sentencing reports is a question of law. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 
4 
62, fl3, 6 P.3d 1133 (citing State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f32, 999 
P.2d 7). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) , "requires the sentencing 
judge to consider the party's objections to the report, make 
findings on the record as to whether the information objected to 
is accurate, and determine on the record whether that information 
is relevant to the issue of sentencing." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 
1, ^44
 # 973 P.2d 404; State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, %26, 94 
P.3d 2 95. As conceded by the State, the record demonstrates that 
the sentencing court failed to duly consider the inaccuracies set 
forth in the Presentence Report. However, contrary to the State's 
assertion, Mr. Waterfield raised numerous objections at sentencing 
through appointed counsel to the Presentence Report, including, 
among other various inaccuracies, incorrect drug treatment 
programs in which, according to AP&P, Mr. Waterfield had 
participated (R. 470:19-30). Thereafter, the court simply stated 
that it would "accept those additional corrections." (R. 
470:30:24-25). As a result, the objections were not resolved as 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. 
The general statement made by the sentencing judge about the 
inaccuracies of Mr. Waterfield's Presentence Report was 
insufficient. Cf. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl4, 6 P.3d 1137. 
By so doing, the sentencing judge "failed to make the specific 
5 
findings on the record as mandated by the statute." Id. at fl5. 
By failing to duly consider the inaccuracies, the sentencing court 
did not comply with its duty to properly resolve Mr. Waterfield's 
objections. 
III. APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR, WATERFIELD OF 
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO AFFIRMATIVELY 
REQUEST THAT THE SENTENCING COURT EXERCISE ITS 
FACT FINDING FUNCTION TO RESOLVE THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT OBJECTIONS. 
The State argues that this Court should decline to consider 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it is 
inadequately briefed. See Brief of Appellee State of Utah, p. 41. 
This argument is without merit. 
As recognized by Utah's appellate courts, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 
2052 (1984), established a two-prong test for determining when a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment4 right to effective assistance of 
counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The test 
requires a defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
4The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that u[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
6 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P. 2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
u[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized 
not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the 
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, 
a fair sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 
S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
Under the first prong, a defendant must "Nidentify the acts 
or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 'show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P. 2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 
(footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome the strong 
presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised reasonable professional judgment." State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 
S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
7 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. UA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); State v. 
Frame, 723 P. 2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) . Both prongs are established 
in the instant case. 
Appointed trial counsel in this case failed to specifically 
request that the sentencing court exercise its fact finding 
function to resolve the remaining inaccuracies in the presentence 
report. By so doing, he rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Had appointed trial counsel so requested, he would have 
most likely alerted the sentencing court to its duty under the 
statute. Trial counsel's failure fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated by 
existing Utah case law, as previously discussed, the plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) , not to mention the 
underlying factual circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional failure to request that the 
sentencing court utilize its fact finding function, the result at 
sentencing would have been different. As mentioned above, had the 
sentencing court been alerted by appointed trial counsel of its 
obligation, the court more likely than not would have duly 
8 
considered the inaccuracies set forth in the presentence 
investigation report, which, in turn, would have allowed the 
sentencing court to more fully and accurately consider the fact, 
among other things, that Mr. Waterfield, to that point, had no 
real inpatient drug treatment program to help treat his addition. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Waterfield respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's sua sponte Rule 
22(e) ruling and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of August, 2010. 
JX& WIGGINS, P.C. 
JWic 
for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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